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The school is often seen as a microcosm of wider society.  It is therefore fitting that 
decisions made by schools have made a significant impact on the debate concerning 
the extent to which religious and racial diversity should be accommodated, a question 
that has dominated the public discourse in the wake of September 11th 2001.   Three 
cases concerning schools reflect the changing extent to which and means by which 
English law accommodates religious and racial difference.  This chapter seeks to 
explore the changing face of English law by reference to these three decisions: R v 
Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson in 
2005 (hereafter ‘Williamson’), R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School in 2006 (hereafter ‘Begum’) and R (on the 
application of Watkins-Singh) v The Governing Body of Aberdare Girls’ High School 
in 2008 (hereafter ‘Watkins-Singh’). Building upon previous work (Hill and Sandberg, 
2006; 2007 and Sandberg, 2008), it contends that the reasoning of Begum has set an 
unfortunate and flawed precedent that has constrained religious liberty in England and 
Wales.  
 
The Human Rights Act 1998  
 
The face of English law had already been changed before these cases (Doe and 
Sandberg, 2009).  The Human Rights Act 1998 had ushered in a more rights driven 
approach to civil liberties.  The largely negative but flexible protection provided by 
the common law was superseded by the protection of religious liberty as a positive 
right. A previous legislative and judicial stance of passive accommodation had been 
replaced by prescriptive regulation (see King, 2007: chapter 5; Hill and Sandberg, 
2006, 2007: 490).  The Human Rights Act 1998 largely incorporated the European 
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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into English law.  Previously, the ECHR 
simply had the status of a treaty obligation under international law: although 
individual petition to the European Court in Strasbourg had been permitted since 
1966, domestic courts lacked the ‘jurisdiction directly to enforce the rights and 
freedoms under the Convention’ (R. v DDP ex p. Kebeline).   
 
During this period, Articles of the Convention, including Article 9 which protects 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, were simply regarded as an aid to 
interpretation; although English courts sought to ensure that their decisions conformed 
to the ECHR, they were under no obligation to follow it, and the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights, slavishly to the letter (Hill and Sandberg, 2007: 
491).    This is well illustrated by the case of Ahmad v Inner London Education 
Authority in 1978 concerning a Muslim school teacher, who was employed full time 
but sought to take 45 minutes off every Friday for prayer.  He left his employment 
claiming constructive unfair dismissal. The Court of Appeal dismissed his claim, 
holding that the termination of employment was consistent with domestic education 
and employment law. Scarman LJ dissented, holding that domestic law should be 
construed broadly against the ECHR. He commented that:  
‘society has changed since 1944: so also has the legal background. Religions, 
such as Islam and Buddhism, have substantial followings among our people. 
… This calls not for a policy of the blind eye but for one of understanding. 
The system must be made sufficiently flexible to accommodate their beliefs 
and their observances’ (at 48).  
His fellow judges, however, were less enthusiastic about following the ECHR, with 
Lord Denning, in particular, questioning whether reference to Article 9 would help the 
claimant and doubted more generally whether reference to the style and form of the 
Convention would be helpful and sufficiently flexible if followed to the letter:  
‘The convention is not part of our English law, but, as I have often said, we 
will always have regard to it. … We will do our best to see that our decisions 
are in conformity with it. But it is drawn in such vague terms that it can be 
used for all sorts of unreasonable claims and provoke all sorts of litigation. As 
so often happens with high-sounding principles, they have to be brought down 
to earth’ (at 41). 
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The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the positive right to religious liberty 
provided by Article 9 into English law and required courts to take into account - 
though not necessarily follow (R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State 
for the Environment, Transport and the Regions) - the decisions of the European 
Court at Strasbourg.  However, whilst at first, the impact of the Human Rights Act 
1998 in matters of religious and racial difference seemed to fulfil the predictions of 
Scarman LJ, following the decision in Begum suggests that it was Lord Denning’s 
comments which were prophetic. 
 
Article 9 in Strasbourg Jurisprudence  
 
The changing interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998 found in Williamson, 
Begum and Watkins-Singh needs to be understood in the context of the Strasbourg 
case law on Article 9.  The European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg generally 
takes a formulaic approach to religious liberty cases.  In line with similar international 
human rights instruments on religious liberty, Article 9 ECHR provides an absolute 
right to both the freedom of thought, conscience and religion (known as the forum 
internum) and a qualified right to manifest religion or belief (the forum externum). 
The right to manifest one’s religion or belief is qualified by Article 9(1) in that the 
manifestation must be ‘in worship, teaching, practice and observance’ and by the 
possible limitations in Article 9(2) which permits the State to interfere with the right if 
the three tests in Article 9(2) are met: the interference needs to be ‘prescribed by law’, 
be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and have a ‘legitimate aim’ as spelled out in 
the Article.  
 
Most cases are concerned with the latter qualified right. In dealing with such cases, 
Strasbourg organs invariably begin by stressing the importance of the right, citing the 
leading case, Kokkinakis v Greece, which elucidated how ‘Freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the 
meaning of the Convention’. Although they then ask whether Article 9(1) has been 
interfered with or has been engaged, this is often a formality and the focus shifts to 
the Article 9(2) limitations, which are used to determine whether the limitation by the 
State was justified. Since the Article 9(2) limitations have an ‘elastic character’ 
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(Sandberg, 2006: 455) this allows the court to consider the merits of the case, before 
reaching an appropriate conclusion.  
 
The Strasbourg focus is upon whether the interference with the right to manifest is 
justified rather than whether there was an interference with the right to manifest. The 
threshold in relation to interference is low. The battleground is generally Article 9(2) 
rather than Article 9(1). This is particularly true in relation to more recent decisions of 
the Strasbourg court. Earlier decisions tended to rely more upon filtering devices to 
exclude superfluous claims. Three such devices were developed: first, the definition 
of belief filter, stating that Article 9 would only protect a worldview held with ‘a 
certain level of cogency, serious reflection and importance’ (Campbell and Cosans v 
United Kingdom); second, the manifestation / motivation requirement requiring that 
the claimant’s actions manifest their religion or belief as opposed to being merely 
motivated by it (Arrowsmith v United Kingdom); and third, the specific situation rule, 
recognising that a person’s Article 9 rights may be curtailed by the particular situation 
of the individual claiming that freedom (Ahmad v United Kingdom).  
 
These devices are relied upon less and less by Strasbourg organs. The 
manifestation/motivation requirement is not always applied and when it is, the test has 
often been rephrased as requiring, for example, that the action is ‘intimately linked’ to 
the claimant’s religion or belief (Knights, 2007: 44); a requirement which is 
seemingly more elastic and less strict. The specific situation rule has limited 
application, applying only where someone has voluntarily submitted to a voluntary 
system of rules, typically by voluntarily submitting to military service or a contract of 
employment (Hill and Sandberg, 2007: 495). Although Strasbourg institutions seemed 
to go further in Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France by 
imposing an ‘impossibility test’ requiring that an ‘alternative means of 
accommodating religious beliefs had ... to be “impossible” before a claim of 
interference under article 9 could succeed’, later Strasbourg decisions have not 
followed this (Hill and Sandberg, 2007: 495).  
 
Indeed, more recent cases have seen a change in approach with Strasbourg taking ‘a 
broader view of what amounts to an interference’ (Knights, 2007: 44) and giving 
more attention to the Article 9(2) limitations rather than the semantics of Article 9(1). 
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In Thlimmenos v Greece, for example, the Court simply accepted that the ‘set of facts’ 
complained of ‘falls within the ambit’ of Article 9 since it was ‘prompted’ by the 
claimant’s religion or belief and noted that it did ‘not find it necessary’ to examine 
whether the facts ‘amounted to interference with his rights under Article 9(1)’. In 
Sahin v Turkey, the Court proceeded on the assumption that the regulations in issue, 
which placed restrictions of place and manner on the right to wear the Islamic 
headscarf in universities, constituted an interference with the applicant's right to 
manifest her religion. These cases convey a preference on the part of Strasbourg 
institutions whereby the use of filtering devices is minimised and attention is paid 
instead to the question of whether the interference was justified.  
 
The Impact of Williamson  
 
The incorporation of Article 9 into domestic law effective from October 2000 
originally led English courts to follow the trend set by Strasbourg.  This was 
epitomised by the House of Lords decisions in Williamson.  The case was brought by 
head teachers, teachers and parents of children at four independent schools where 
discipline was enforced by the use of mild corporal punishment. They contended that 
the ban on corporal punishment in schools (Education Act 1998, s. 548) was 
incompatible with their belief that physical punishment was part of the duty of 
education in a Christian context and so infringed, inter alia, Article 9 ECHR.  While 
lower courts sought to exclude the claim largely by reference to the Article 9(1) right, 
the House of Lords focussed on the Article 9(2) limitations and specifically ruled out 
the use of filtering devices.  
 
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, doubted whether it was right for courts, except in 
extreme cases, ‘to impose an evaluative filter’ at the stage of identifying whether there 
was a belief, ‘especially when religious beliefs are involved’ (para 57). Lord Nicholls 
was adamant that while Courts may be concerned with whether the claim of religious 
belief was made in good faith, they are not concerned whether the religious belief 
professed is a good faith in terms of judging the validity of that faith (para 22; 
Sandberg, 2008). Although both Lord Nicholls and Lord Walker defended the use of 
the Strasbourg manifestation rule, they seemed to support the re-formulated and 
relaxed version of this rule focussing upon whether the act is ‘“intimately linked” to 
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the belief’ and clarifying that this does not mean ‘that a perceived obligation is a 
prerequisite to manifestation of a belief in practice’ (see paras 31 and 62). Lord 
Nicholls also rejected the application of the ‘specific situation’ rule as in this case the  
rule did not apply on the facts since there was ‘no comparable special feature 
affecting the position of the claimant parents’ (at para 39). He also rejected as 
unrealistic the submission of the Secretary of State that there has been no interference: 
the law ‘left open to the parents several adequate, alternative courses of action’ (para 
40-41).  
 
After considering but rejecting all three filtering devices, the House followed a typical 
Strasbourg approach finding that although there had been interference with the 
applicants’ Article 9 rights, this was justified under Article 9(2) as being prescribed 
by law, necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others, and as having a legitimate aim to protect children as a vulnerable group and 
promote their well being.  The House of Lords attracted much praise for following ‘a 
classic human rights approach’ (Langlaude, 2006: 345). Lord Walker, in particular, 
contended that a holistic approach to the Article should be taken since ‘the issues of 
engagement, interference and justification are in truth closely linked together’ (para 
57). This approach and that of Lord Nicholls has been welcomed (Langlaude, 2006; 
Hill, 2007: 31). By contrast, the different approach of Lady Hale focussing upon 
‘children’s rights’ has been criticised (Langlaude, 2006: 344-345): as Hill (2006) has 
noted ‘The purposive sociology of Baroness Hale may inspire liberal attitudes but it 
makes advising clients in Swindon County Court next to impossible’. 
 
Following Williamson, the lower courts began to develop a considered jurisprudence 
on Article 9, following the trend set by Strasbourg. The High Court in Khan v Royal 
Air Force Summary Appeal Court recognised this, noting that while in ‘earlier years 
the Commission in particular has often appeared to take a rather formal approach to 
Art.9(1)’ and there appeared ‘to have been some unwillingness to allow for the 
possibility of the engagement of Art.9(1) and thus to get into the question of 
justification under Art.9(2)’, it was possible to detect a ‘new preparedness to allow for 
possibilities that state interference under Art.9(1) may have to be justified’ (para 95). 
This change in English jurisprudence was demonstrated by the decision of the Court 
of Appeal in Copsey v WBB Devon Clays Ltd.   Although the claimant was 
Pre-print version of a book chapter accepted by Roultedge and published in Grillo, Ralph, et al 
eds.  Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 267-282. 
7 
unsuccessful in his claim that his dismissal for refusing to agree to a contractual 
variation in his working hours to in produce a rotating shift procedure which included 
some Sunday working was unfair, the Court provided a refined analysis of Article 9, 
stressing the importance of considering Article 9(2) and singling out the Strasbourg 
specific situation rule for criticism.  Mummery LJ, for instance, noted that the 
‘specific situation’ rule was simply constituted of ‘repeated assertions unsupported by 
the evidence or reasoning that would normally accompany a judicial ruling’ which 
were ‘difficult to square with the supposed fundamental character of the rights’ (para 
35), he declared that if there had been no such authority, he would have thought it 
necessary to examine the arguments under Article 9(2) (para 30).    
 
Other cases, however, did not follow the approach in Williamson. For example, whilst 
some ecclesiastical court decisions on exhumation and Article 9 (such as Re 
Durrington Cemetery) were exemplary, the judgement of Chancellor Bursell in Re 
Crawley Green Road Cemetery, Luton seemed to overstate the importance of Article 
9 by presenting it as an absolute right which trumps domestic law (Sandberg, 2006). 
Nevertheless the general trend was that lower courts followed the Strasbourg-
complaint approach favoured by the House of Lords in Williamson.   However, this 
trend was upset by another House of Lords decision, that of Begum.  
 
The Impact of Begum  
 
The case concerned Begum’s wearing of the long jilbab coat in a state school contrary 
to the school’s uniform policy; she contended that she had been ‘excluded/suspended’ 
from the school in breach, inter alia, of Article 9. At all three levels, the courts 
struggled with the interpretation of Article 9 (Hill and Sandberg, 2006). The High 
Court focussed on the issue of exclusion but noted that if she had been excluded, she 
would have been ‘excluded for her refusal to abide by the school uniform policy 
rather than her beliefs as such’ and since this would only have been ‘motivated by 
religious beliefs’, there had been no interference with her Article 9(1) right (paras 72-
74).  This assertion that insistence on wearing religious dress does not constitute a 
manifestation of one’s religion or belief per se seems questionable (Hill and 
Sandberg, 2007: 496).  
 
Pre-print version of a book chapter accepted by Roultedge and published in Grillo, Ralph, et al 
eds.  Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 267-282. 
8 
The Court of Appeal, in holding that there was a breach of Article 9, took a different 
approach. Its treatment of Article 9(1) was exemplary: the Court held that there was 
interference with Article 9 and noted that the specific situation rule had no 
application. Brooke LJ claimed that he was unable to derive any assistance from the 
cases the court was shown which related to employment disputes (para 62) while 
Mummery LJ concurred, noting that it was no answer that she could have attended 
school if only she had worn the uniform and that it was irrelevant that she could have 
changed schools to accommodate her religious beliefs since she was not in the same 
position as an employee; rather there was a statutory duty to provide education and 
the school did not follow the proper statutory procedure for excluding her (para 84).  
 
However, the Court of Appeal erred in relation to the application of Article 9(2).  
Rather than deciding whether the restriction on the right to manifest prescribed by 
school uniform could be justified as being necessary in a democratic society, Brooke 
LJ outlined the decision-making structure which the school should have used since, 
on his findings, the onus lay on the school to justify its interference with the 
Convention right (para 75-76). This rests on a basic mistake: whilst courts apply such 
a proportionality test when reviewing decisions of public authorities after they have 
been made, there is nothing in the Human Rights Act 1998, the ECHR or Convention 
jurisprudence that requires public authorities themselves to adopt a proportionality 
approach to the structuring of their own decision-making (Poole, 2005). The Court of 
Appeal hid ‘under the blanket of procedure’ producing a regrettable and erroneous 
approach imposing ‘a stifling culture of formalism on public administrators that is 
quite at odds with the substantive objectives’ of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Poole, 
2005: 694).  
 
The House of Lords decision corrected the Court of Appeal’s overly formulaic 
interpretation of Article 9(2).  However, rather than following the Court of Appeal’s 
exemplary treatment of Article 9 (1) the majority of the House of repeated and 
compounded the error originally made by the High Court (Hill and Sandberg, 2007: 
497). Lords Bingham, Hoffmann and Scott held that there had been no interference 
with the applicant’s rights under Article 9(1). Lord Bingham held that although 
Article 9(1) of the ECHR was ‘engaged or applicable’ because Begum sincerely held 
the religious belief which she professed to hold (para 21), Article 9 does not protect 
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all acts motivated or inspired by belief (para 22). He summed up the ‘specific 
situation’ rule developed by Strasbourg thus: 
‘The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an interference 
with the right to manifest religious belief in practice or observance where a 
person has voluntarily accepted an employment or role which does not 
accommodate that practice or observance and there are other means open to 
the person to practise or observe his or her religion without undue hardship or 
inconvenience’ (para 23). 
This ignores the move against such filtering devices in Strasbourg jurisprudence and 
suggests that the interference requirement is rarely met. No reason was given for the 
application of the specific situation rule to the school environment where there is no 
contractual relationship between the pupil and the school (Hill and Sandberg, 2006).  
Moreover, although Lord Bingham’s elucidation of the specific situation rule required 
both voluntary acceptance of a rule and an alternative means to manifest religion or 
belief, Lord Bingham seemed to place great emphasis upon this second limb: he held 
that there was no interference with Begum’s right to manifest her belief in practice or 
observance since Begum’s family chose the school from outside their own catchment 
area and that there was ‘no evidence to show that there was any real difficulty in her 
attending’ another school (para 25). This conclusion, supported by Lords Hoffmann 
and Scott, suggests that provided there is a choice then an applicant’s Article 9 right 
to manifest is not even engaged. This point brings domestic law in line with the much-
criticised Strasbourg case of Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek 
v France. This is particularly disturbing since both Lord Hoffmann and Lord 
Bingham followed Williamson in questioning the correctness of this case.  
 
Lord Bingham’s further elucidation of the rule proved even more suspect: quoting 
selectively from numerous Strasbourg and domestic cases on the ‘specific situation’ 
rule, Lord Bingham omitted to mention references to the caveats to the rule,  and 
applied the rule to the facts of the case without explanation (Hill and Sandberg, 2007: 
497). Although he recognised the view of the Court of Appeal in Copsey v WBB 
Devon Clays Ltd, he effectively gave the specific situation rule general application by 
concluding that:  
‘Even if it be accepted that the Strasbourg institutions have erred on the side of 
strictness in rejecting complaints of interference, there remains a coherent and 
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remarkably consistent body of authority which our domestic courts must take 
into account and which shows that interference is not easily established’ (para 
24).  
This very broad proposition that ‘interference is not easily established’ seems to over-
state the law. The Court of Appeal judgement in Copsey v WBB Devon Clays Ltd and 
more recent Strasbourg decisions question whether the body of authority should be 
followed as being coherent and consistent.  Reliance on the specific situation rule was 
also unnecessary since if it was simply accepted that Article 9 was engaged, the claim 
could nevertheless be defeated by the use of one or more of the Article 9(2) 
limitations (Sandberg and Hill, 2006; 2007). 
 
The preferable reasoning is that of the minority, who concurred with the majority in 
the ultimate disposal of the appeal (Hill and Sandberg, 2007: 498; Knights, 2007: 48). 
Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale recognised that Article 9 had been engaged but that the 
interference was justified under Article 9(2). However, it is unfortunate that their 
speeches did not explain why their approach was the consistent interpretation of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. Although the House of Lords judgement in Begum includes 
helpful obiter dicta, such as passages correcting the Court of Appeal’s procedural 
approach and hinting at a domestic ‘margin of appreciation’ (see paras 34, 63-64) it is 
a matter of regret that the ratio of the case is flawed. Giving universal effect to the 
specific situation rule and then rigidly applying it as a filtering device was likely to be 
problematic in terms of precedent. Although the speeches of the majority considered 
Article 9(2) in obiter and thus gave consideration to the merits of the case, a future 
court would not be obliged to do so. The majority’s unnecessary and erroneous 
treatment of Article 9(1) had the clear potential of undoing the legacy of Williamson. 
 
The case law following Begum suggested that the reasoning of the majority had 
undone the legacy of Williamson, with the overly narrow approach of the majority 
being adopted uncritically by lower courts and tribunals (Hill and Sandberg, 2007: 
498; Hill, 2007: 31; Sandberg, 2008).   In R (on the application of X) v Y School the 
High Court regarded the Begum decision as an ‘an insuperable barrier’ (para 100) to a 
claim for judicial review by a twelve year old school girl who wished to wear a niqab 
veil while she was at school and being taught by male teachers or when she was likely 
to be seen by men (Hill and Sandberg, 2007: 498-499). Drawing on Lord Bingham’s 
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elucidation of the ‘specific situation’ rule in Begum, Silber J interpreted this as 
meaning that there would be no interference either where a person has voluntarily 
accepted an employment or role that does not accommodate that practice or 
observance or where there are other means open to practise or observe that religion 
without undue hardship or inconvenience (para 26). Although this goes further than 
Lord Bingham who said that both requirements were needed, this is not unsurprising 
since it takes the majority’s reasoning in Begum to its natural conclusion by giving 
general effect to the specific situation rule, bringing English law in line with the 
discredited ‘impossibility’ test provided in Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are 
Shalom Ve Tsedek v France (Hill and Sandberg, 2007: 448). 
 
Although more recent civil cases have not gone quite as far as R (on the application of 
X) v Y School, they have shown a stricter approach to Article 9(1) than was the case 
prior to Begum (Sandberg, 2008). In R (on the Application of Playfoot (A Child) v 
Millais School Governing Body the High Court rejected an application for judicial 
review on behalf of a school girl who had wanted to wear a ‘purity’ ring at school as a 
symbol of her religiously-motivated commitment to celibacy before marriage. 
Michael Supperstone QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, held that Article 9 
was not engaged since the wearing of the ring was not a manifestation of her religious 
belief: it was not ‘intimately linked’ to the belief in chastity before marriage because 
the claimant was under no obligation, by reason of her faith, to wear the ring. This 
seems at odds not only with the more liberal application of the motivation / 
manifestation distinction found in the speech of Lord Nicholls in Williamson and 
recent Strasbourg jurisprudence but also runs the risk of infringing the well-
established principle emphasized by Lord Nicholls in Williamson that courts should 
not be concerned whether the religious belief professed is a good faith in terms of 
judging the validity of that faith (Sandberg, 2008). Determining whether an action is a 
manifestation of a person’s religion or belief by determining whether that action was 
mandated by that person’s religion as interpreted by a Deputy High Court Judge 
seems inappropriate.  
 
Moreover, the High Court in Playfoot also invoked the post-Begum version of the 
specific situation rule. The judge held that there was no interference with Article 9 
since the claimant had voluntarily accepted the school’s uniform policy and there 
Pre-print version of a book chapter accepted by Roultedge and published in Grillo, Ralph, et al 
eds.  Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 267-282. 
12 
were other means open to her to practise her belief without undue hardship or 
inconvenience (para 32). This conclusion not only follows Begum in accepting that 
the rule applies to schoolchildren but also follows Begum in casting the rule as one of 
general application. The judge placed emphasis upon this argument, noting that the 
claimant could have expressed her belief in another way, for example by attaching the 
ring, a key ring or other visible signs to her school bag or by transferring to another 
school which would allow the wearing of the ring. These comments suggest that the 
‘specific situation’ aspect of the ‘specific situation’ rule is increasingly broader in 
domestic case law than in the Strasbourg jurisprudence. The rule has moved beyond 
its original contractual setting and the scope of the rule is now unknown (Sandberg, 
2008). The reasoning of the High Court is a matter of regret, given that the same 
decision could be made in a more Strasbourg-complaint manner by simply holding 
that there had been interference with Article 9 and that interference would have been 
justified under Article 9(2). Although the High Court to date has followed the House 
of Lords in Begum in undertaking some analysis of Article 9(2), this analysis has been 
purely obiter, allowing courts in the future to base their decisions solely on the less-
convincing dicta concerning whether or not Article 9 was engaged. 
 
It is also of concern that commendable elements of the House of Lords judgement in 
Begum have been forgotten. This is clear from High Court and Court of Appeal 
decisions in R (on the Application of Swami Suryananda) v Welsh Ministers 
concerning whether the slaughter of Shambo, a bullock at the claimant’s Hindu 
temple, which had tested positive for the bacterium that causes bovine tuberculosis 
(TB), breached the claimant’s human rights (Sandberg, 2008). In the High Court, 
whilst the applicability of Article 9(1) was quickly accepted, confusion arose in 
relation to the application of Article 9(2) in that the judge quashed the decision by the 
Welsh Ministers (to order the slaughter) on the basis that they had failed to approach 
the balancing exercise required under Article 9(2) since they had not identified a 
public interest to balance against the individual rights of the Community; rather, they 
had defined their legitimate object too narrowly to be a proper public interest 
objective for the purposes of Article 9(2). The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed 
the appeal, criticising the High Court for erroneously focussing upon the ‘whether the 
decision maker proceeded in the right way’, when the focus should have simply been 
on ‘whether the decision taken does or does not infringe the relevant rights’ (para 
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103). The High Court had made the same mistake as the Court of Appeal in Begum. 
The Court of Appeal, however, followed a classic human rights and Strasbourg-
compliant approach by using the Article 9(2) limits to hold that the interference was 
justified, thereby setting aside the order quashing the slaughter notice (Sandberg, 
2008). However, despite the decision of the Court of Appeal in Swami Suryananda v 
Welsh Ministers, the decision in Watkins-Singh was to demonstrate that the effect of 
Begum was to leave Article 9 moribund.  
 
The Impact of Watkins-Singh  
 
The case concerned Sarika Angel Watkins-Singh, a fourteen year old girl of Punjabi-
Welsh heritage, who attended Aberdare Girls’ High School.  After being asked to her 
to remove her kara, defined judicially as ‘a plain steel bangle which has a width of 
about 50 millimetres’ (para 1), since it contravened the school’s uniform policy, she 
unsuccessfully sought an exemption from the policy on the basis that her kara was a 
matter central to her ethnic identity and religious observance which meant that she 
was taught in isolation and then educated at Mountain Ash School, which permitted 
the wearing of a kara.   The Governing Body of the School had refused the request for 
an exemption on Article 9 grounds. Invoking the language of the post-Begum 
domestic specific situation rule, the Governors originally refused on the basis that it 
has ‘not been convinced that, as part of her religion, it was a requirement that the kara 
be worn on the wrist, that if it were allowed this may result in bullying from other 
pupils and the wearing would give rise to health and safety issues’ (para 16). The 
Appeal Committee of the Governing Body was even more specific, refusing a 
subsequent appeal on the basis that ‘article 9 of the ECHR does not require that one 
should be allowed to manifest one’s religion at any time and place of one’s choosing’ 
(para 17).  Watkins-Singh challenged the decisions of the Governing Body of the 
school contending that they were based on errors of law.   
 
Crucially, whilst the school saw the case as concerning Article 9 and therefore likely 
to be unsuccessful due to Begum, Watkins-Singh’s legal team did not argue the case 
on Article 9 grounds.  Rather, it was argued that the refusal to allow Watkins-Singh to 
wear the Kara at school was unlawful as indirect unjustified race and religious 
discrimination contrary to the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Equality Act 2006.  A 
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number of other claims were also made, most notably that the defendant had not 
complied with the general statutory duty under section 71 of Race Relations Act 1976, 
but the only human rights based claim was a contention that the segregation of 
Watkins-Singh contravened her rights under Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR.  The 
difference between Watkins-Singh and the previous religious dress cases was 
elucidated by Silber J at the start of his judgment: he noted that unlike the previous 
cases of Begum, X v Y, and Playfoot which were ‘founded largely, if not solely on the 
provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998’, the claim in the present case was ‘based 
mainly on the totally different provisions’ of the Race Relations Act 1976 and the 
Equality Act 2006, ‘provisions on which the claimants in the previous case were 
unable to rely on’ (para 3).  The previous claimants had been unable to rely on race 
discrimination laws since adherents of Islam and Christianity are not seen as races 
whilst Sikhs and Jews are (Mandla v Dowell Lee; Seide v Gillette Industries Limited 
cf. J H Walker Limited v Hussain and Others).  Part 2 of the Equality Act 2006 which 
extended religious discrimination to cover goods and services and the exercise of 
public functions was not in force at the time of the earlier cases.  
 
The claim for indirect discrimination on grounds of religion and race was upheld.  In 
so holding Silber J employed a much more generous approach to religious symbols 
which are not mandated by the religion in the discrimination law context, than the 
High Court did in Playfoot in the human rights context.  In Watkins-Singh, the 
question of whether the wearing of the kara was obligatory to the claimant was 
sidestepped.   Although the expert evidence suggested that it was the initiated Sikhs 
who observed all five Ks, of which the kara was one, and Watkins-Singh was an 
observant non-initiated Sikh, the expert also suggested that of the five Ks, the kara 
was the symbol most commonly worn.  Silber J held that in relation to claims of 
indirect discrimination, he was unable to accept the defendant’s contention that there 
would be a disadvantage only where a member of the group is prevented from 
wearing something that they are required to wear (para 51).   This threshold was too 
high: the language of the provisions do not suggest such a threshold, such an 
interpretation would require rewriting the legislative provision, would be inconsistent 
with the approach in recent Strasbourg jurisprudence, has no authority and has no 
valid reason of principle.  Silber J commented that: 
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‘the court should not impose too high a threshold in seeking to establish prima 
facie discrimination as to do so would undermine the intension of the 
legislation’ (para 67).   
He therefore concluded that disadvantage would occur – but would not only occur – 
where a pupil is forbidden from wearing an item where ‘that person genuinely 
believed for reasonable grounds that wearing this item was a matter of exceptional 
importance to this or her racial identity or his or her religious belief’ and where ‘the 
wearing of the item can be shown objectively to be of exceptional importance to his 
or her religion or race, even if the wearing of the article is not an actual requirement 
of that person’s religion or race’ (para 56B).  Both the subjective and objective 
elements are satisfied on the facts:  nothing had been suggested to undermine the 
truthfulness of Watkins-Singh’s comments and the wearing of the item can be shown 
to be of  exceptional importance to her religion and race as a Sikh even if not a 
requirement of that religion or a race. The reasons given by Silber J are strong and 
raise the question why the same conclusion ought not to be applied in the human 
rights context.  By relying on Strasbourg cases for the ‘exceptional importance’ test 
Silber J’s judgment questions the sharp distinction drawn in Playfoot.  
 
Moreover, ironically in this case agued on discrimination grounds, the High Court 
cited and followed the dicta in Williamson concerning how a court should decide 
whether a claimant is genuinely manifesting a religious belief:  Silber J noted that 
whilst the court may inquire into the genuineness of a claimant’s belief as an issue of 
fact, it is not for the court to inquire into its validity.  This again questions the 
decision in Playfoot.   Furthermore, unlike the cases argued on Article 9 grounds, 
questions of justification were not mere obiter statements in Watkins-Singh.  
Interestingly Silber J again sought to distinguish the instant case from the Article 9 
case law: ‘decisions on justification which were successfully used by schools in the 
Begum, X v Y School and Playfoot cases’ did not apply since ‘many of the aspects of 
justification relied on in those cases are related to the extremely clearly visible and 
very ostentatious nature of the religious dress ought to be worn’ (para 78).  However, 
this distinction is suspect. Silber J contended that it could not be said that allowing 
pupils to wear a kara causes substantial difficulties because they may stand out and 
that it undermined the uniform policy’s aim of fostering a community spirit because 
the kara is small and is usually hidden by a long-sleeved sweater. This may be true in 
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relation to the cases on Muslim dress but this was hardly true of the ring in Playfoot.  
The argument that the kara, unlike a ring, could be covered up is erroneous on two 
grounds:  first, the kara was seen by the teacher on the day in which Watkins-Singh 
was asked to remove it; second, as Silber J’s language conceded it was simply the 
case that it was ‘usually’ covered by a long sleeve as opposed to always covered. 
Surely, obtrusiveness was ultimately irrelevant to the issue.  Silber J sought to 
distinguish the justifications put forward in Playfoot on the grounds that in the instant 
case it could not be said that the ban was justified in that it minimised pressures 
resulting from wealth and style.  However, this sees the purity ring in Playfoot as 
simply a fashion accessory: a conclusion undermined by the fact that the lifestyle it 
symbolises is, if anything, out of fashion.  A watertight distinction between the 
justifications accepted in the previous cases and the justifications rejected in the 
instant case is unsustainable.  
 
Silber J also rejected the ‘floodgates’ argument on the basis that it was far from 
obvious that other pupils would be able to invoke this exception which is dependent 
on two factors: the first is that both the subjective and objective tests would have to be 
met: ‘the belief of the pupil justified by objective evidence that the wearing of the 
article is a matter of exceptional importance as an expression of race and culture’; the 
second is the ‘unobtrusive nature of the kara’ (para 92).  However, this need for 
‘objective evidence’ also raises the risk of courts engaging in issues upon which 
Williamson establishes that they should not tread since determining that ‘evidence’ 
invariably stretches if not defies the Williamson principles concerning the role of the 
court.  Watkins-Singh is preferable to the Article 9 case law in that it does not fail at 
the interference stage.  However, although Watkins-Singh is welcome in that it does 
not say that a religious manifestation has to be mandatory to be protected, Watkins-
Singh disappoints in setting a high threshold for protection in the case of a religious 
manifestation which is not mandatory which suggests that  both an objective and 
subjective test is required.  It would be far preferable for the question of justification 
to be decisive.   
  
It is of interest that all the other various claims made in Watkins-Singh succeeded 
apart from the human rights based one.  The segregation of Watkins-Singh did not 
contravene her rights under Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR; it was necessary to 
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proceed on the basis that she was content at school, Article 8 was not infringed. This 
claim did not add anything to the claim of indirect discrimination (para 137).  This 
was telling of the approach generally taken: Watkins-Singh was not argued on Article 
9 grounds because it is likely that on Article 9 grounds it would have failed, as the 
school governors readily understood.  The case was successful because it seemed that 
the school, its teachers or its governors had not been informed, let alone instructed, on 
the significance of discrimination law generally and particularly to the dispute.  
Although the new law on religious discrimination offers a means of protecting 
religious freedom in lieu of Article 9, the restriction of Article 9 post-Begum remains 
lamentable. Silber J’s comments concerning whether a religious undertaking needs to 
be mandatory and the proper role of the court in Watkins-Singh are to be welcomed.  
However, the threshold imposed in relation to interference still seems too high.  
Many cases – even those argued on discrimination rather than Article 9 grounds – will 
continue to fall at the first hurdle.  Surely the preferable approach would be to focus 
on the question of justification rather than saying that a religious practice must be 
mandatory or virtually mandatory (which is what Silber J’s ‘exceptional importance’ 
test amounts to) before their religious freedom is infringed.  Focusing on the question 
of justification would mean that if Watkins-Singh was successfully decided, then the 
decision in Playfoot is suspect.  The mere fact that Article 9 was not argued in 
Watkins-Singh is important.  It seems to suggest that Begum has restricted the 
application of Article 9 to such an extent that it has become moribund, at least in 
relation to claims concerning religious dress.  
 
Conclusions: The Legacy of Begum  
 
The actions of the assistant head teacher of Denbigh High School on the first day of 
the school term in September 2002, in telling Shabina Begum to go home, change and 
return wearing school uniform must have seemed at the time to be rather mundane 
and ordinary.  Yet, the judicial deliberations that followed provided ‘a confusing and 
unhelpful precedent’ that constrained religious liberty in England and Wales (Hill and 
Sandberg, 2007: 498), being regarded as an insuperable barrier by the judiciary ( X v 
Y School, para 100)  and being disregarded by litigants (such as the claimant in 
Watkins-Singh) who now, it appears, seek to rely on anything but Article 9.  
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Given the traditional judicial reluctance to intervene in matters of religion (Hill, 
2001), it is not surprising that the judiciary have struggled with the effects of the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  The significance of the change is underscored by 
comparative reference with the even later incorporation of the ECHR in Ireland 
(European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003) which has had less effect and has 
led to little case law because of the pre-existing constitutional protection of religion. 
Even after the incorporation of the ECHR into Irish law, ‘the principal (if not all) 
cases involving questions of religious freedom or religious issues per se have been 
determined in Ireland with reference to the provisions of Bunreacht na hÉireann 
rather than to the ECHR’ (Colton, 2007).  The UK’s Human Rights Act 1998, by 
contrast, provided a constitutional and cultural shift.  It was thus unsurprising that the 
judiciary in this new task became entangled quite unnecessarily in the semantics of 
the right rather than the merits of the case.   The focus on questions of interference 
rather than justification led judges to rely unduly upon filtering devices, most notably 
the general application of the specific situation rule in Begum. 
 
Whilst prior to Begum, lower courts and tribunals generally followed the ‘classic 
human rights approach’ taken by the House of Lords in Williamson (Langlaude, 2006: 
345),  after Begum, lower courts and tribunals generally adopted an overly restrictive 
interpretation of the Article 9(1) right, with domestic courts falling into problems 
which have largely been avoided by Strasbourg institutions (Sandberg, 2008).  The 
arguments deployed in Watkins-Singh, their success and Silber J’s reasoning are all 
part of the legacy of Begum, a case important not so much for its actual decision but 
for the reasoning of the majority.  It remains to be seen how the legacy of Begum will 
affect subsequent higher court decisions on religious freedom.  
 
Reference to the changing face of English law, as demonstrated in the cases of 
Williamson, Begum and Watkin-Singh, provides a deeper understanding of issues of 
cultural difference which are reduced to ‘moral panics’ (Cohen, 1972) by the media.   
Such legal analysis is of particular importance at a time in which the legal framework 
appears to have changed (Doe and Sandberg, 2009) and further change to the 
constitution is mooted (see Cranmer, 2009).  Reference to changing legal 
interpretations provide a valuable insight into the complex relationship between 
religion, law and society, or to be more precise, religions, laws and societies 
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(Bradney, 2001: 81).  However, a legal approach in isolation may not be sufficient 
(Sandberg, 2009).  For instance, in Begum wider political and social trends – such as 
the fact that it was clear that the girl in question had come through her brothers under 
the influence of Hizb u Tahrir, an extremist religious organisation, in particular, and 
the backdrop of September 11th and July 7 th, in general, – shaped the bringing of the 
claim, the way in which it was argued and the response of the judiciary.  Analysis of 
the reasoning provided in law reports in isolation cannot provide a complete picture of 
changing social norms, yet it does provide a valuable and often neglected contribution 
to wider debates (Twinning, 1994).  In the on-going debate concerning the extent to 
which religious and racial diversity should be accommodated in England and Wales, 
these three cases concerning schools are of considerable importance.  
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